Xiu Li v. Atty;Gen USA by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
11-6-2012 
Xiu Li v. Atty;Gen USA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"Xiu Li v. Atty;Gen USA" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 198. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/198 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
 
         
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-4071 
___________ 
 
XIU YING LI, 
   Petitioner 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                              Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A077-297-720) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Eugene Pugliese 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 1, 2012 
Before:  SMITH, CHAGARES and WEIS, 
(Opinion filed: November 6, 2012) 
Circuit Judges 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Xiu Ying Li petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA” or 
“Board”) order denying her second motion to reopen.  We will deny the petition for 
review. 
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 In 2000, Li, a native and citizen of China, entered the United States without valid 
documentation.  She was placed in removal proceedings and applied for asylum, 
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, alleging 
that she had been persecuted under China’s population control policy.  Following a merits 
hearing, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) determined that Li had not testified credibly and 
thus denied her application for asylum and related relief.  Li appealed the ruling and, in a 
November 2002 decision, the BIA affirmed.  Li did not petition this Court for review of 
that determination.   
 In November 2004, Li filed a motion to reopen her removal proceedings, arguing 
that there had been a change in country conditions in China as a result of the 
government’s enactment of new and more restrictive birth control policies.1
                                              
1  Under the applicable regulations, a motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days 
after the date on which the administrative decision was rendered.  8 C.F.R.  
  The BIA 
determined that Li’s motion was untimely filed and that she was unable to demonstrate a 
change in conditions regarding the family planning policy so as to avoid application of 
the time restriction.  The Board further noted that the births of her three children in the 
United States did not amount to a change in circumstances in China, only a change in her 
§ 1003.2(c)(2).  An exception exists, however, for motions to reopen “based on changed 
country conditions arising in the country of nationality . . ., if such evidence is material 
and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous 
hearing.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). 
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personal circumstances.2
 In October 2009, Li filed a second motion to reopen with the BIA, alleging that 
she will be sterilized upon her return to China due to changed country conditions 
regarding the one-child family planning policy, and that she will be persecuted because of 
her new affiliation with the Jehovah’s Witnesses.  Li argued in her motion that, since her 
last hearing in 2000, conditions in China have worsened because the government more 
stringently enforces family planning laws and laws prohibiting the free exercise of 
religion for Christian churches that are not sanctioned by the government.
  The BIA later denied Li’s motion for reconsideration.  Li did 
not petition this Court for review of either ruling. 
3
 The BIA denied the motion, concluding that the “evidence fail[ed] to establish a 
change in circumstances or country conditions ‘arising in the country of nationality’ so as 
to create an exception to the time and number limitation for filing a late motion to reopen 
to apply for asylum.” (A.R. at 31.)  Li petitioned for review.  This Court granted Li’s 
petition and remanded the case to the BIA after determining that it had failed to 
adequately explain its reasoning for rejecting the evidence that Li submitted in support of 
her motion to reopen.  
 
See Li v. Att’y Gen
                                              
2  Li’s first child was born in China; she has a total of four children. 
, 414 F. App’x 482 (3d Cir. 2011).   
 
3  In support of her motion, Li submitted, inter alia, the 2008 United States Department 
of State Country Report for China; the 2008 United States Department of State 
International Religious Freedom Report for China; various news articles discussing 
China’s policies on population control and Christianity; and two notices issued by the 
Village Committee of Houer Village, Fujian Province, indicating  that she will be 
sterilized upon her return to China because she has given birth to four children. 
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 On remand, the Board again denied Li’s second motion to reopen as time and 
number barred, concluding that the evidence that Li submitted with her motion failed to 
demonstrate any material or substantial change in China.  Specifically, the Board 
concluded that there had not been a significant change in China’s family-planning policy 
since Li’s last administrative hearing.  In this regard, the Board gave the greatest weight 
to the 2008 State Department Reports.  The Board also determined that there had not 
been a change in country conditions regarding the treatment of Jehovah’s Witnesses.  Li 
timely petitioned for review.4
 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and review the Board’s denial 
of Li’s motion for abuse of discretion.  
   
See Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d 
Cir. 2002).  Motions to reopen are plainly “disfavored” because “[t]here is a strong public 
interest in bringing litigation to a close as promptly as is consistent with the interest in 
giving the adversaries a fair opportunity to develop and present their respective cases.”  
INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 107 (1988).  The BIA’s decision is thus entitled to broad 
deference, Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 409 (3d Cir. 2003), and it “will not be 
disturbed unless [it is] found to be arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”  Guo v. 
Ashcroft
                                              
4  The BIA also rejected Li’s argument that she is eligible for relief because she left 
China illegally and applied for asylum in the United States, and it declined to exercise its 
authority to reopen the proceedings sua sponte.  In her opening brief, Li does not 
articulate any challenge to either determination.  As a result, review of those issues has 
been waived.  See Bradley v. Att’y Gen., 603 F.3d 235, 243 n.8 (3d Cir. 2010). 
, 386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted). 
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 As an initial matter, contrary to Li’s argument, we conclude that, on remand, the 
BIA thoroughly considered the evidence and corrected the deficiency in its analysis that 
we identified in our earlier decision in this case.  Moreover, we discern no error in the 
BIA’s evaluation of Li’s evidence. 
 As mentioned, the Board first held that the evidence Li submitted with her motion 
did not provide a sufficient basis for concluding that China’s population control 
enforcement policies have materially changed since Li’s merits hearing in 2000.  The 
BIA did not abuse its discretion in so holding.  For example, Li submitted a 2009 article 
entitled “China to continue family-planning policy,” which states that the Chinese Vice 
Premier had stressed “the importance of continuing the family-planning policy” which 
was introduced in the late 1970’s.  (A.R. at 116.)  The 2008 State Department Country 
Report explains that China has prohibited “the use of physical coercion to compel 
persons to submit to abortion or sterilization.”  (Id. at 218.)  Rather, China mostly relies 
on education, propaganda, economic incentives, and the imposition of social 
compensation fees to enforce its policy.  (Id.
  Li argues that greater attention should have been given to her Village Committee 
Notices.  The BIA did not ignore that evidence.  Rather, the Board determined that the 
Notices were not sufficiently persuasive in light of other, more reliable evidence.  
 at 198.)   
See 
Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 478 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that State Department 
Reports are “the most appropriate and perhaps the best resource for information on 
political situations in foreign nations”) (quotation marks omitted).  Further, in addition to 
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the fact that neither Notice was signed by a member of the Village Committee, both 
Notices failed to indicate what will happen to Li if she does not report to the authorities, 
or the amount of fine that will be imposed.  (A.R. at 109, 112.)  We discern no error in 
the BIA’s decision to afford lesser weight to those documents.  See generally In re H-L-
H- & Z-Y-Z-
 Additionally, our decision in 
, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 214 (BIA 2010) (giving less weight to documents 
which were obtained for the purpose of the hearing, were unsigned, or which even failed 
to identify the authors).   
Chen v. Attorney General, 676 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 
2011), although arising in a different procedural posture, lends further support to the 
BIA’s decision.  In Chen, the petitioners, a married couple from Fujian Province, sought 
relief because they had two U.S.-born children, and they claimed to fear forced 
sterilization and economic penalties should they return to China.  676 F.3d at 114.  In 
affirming the BIA’s decision and rejecting the petitioners’ claims, we determined that In 
re H-L-H- was “persuasive[],” Chen, 676 F.3d at 114, in its conclusion that “‘physical 
coercion to achieve compliance with family planning goals is uncommon and 
unsanctioned by China’s national laws and that the overall policy is much more heavily 
reliant on incentives and economic penalties,’” and that those economic penalties were 
not sufficiently severe to constitute persecution, id. at 115 (quoting In re H-L-H-, 25 I. & 
N. Dec. at 218.).  That description of recent family-planning policies is consistent with 
the description of the policies in the 1999 State Department Report, and accordingly, it 
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was reasonable for the BIA to conclude that Li failed to show that the conditions in China 
have materially changed since her initial 2000 hearing. 
 We also agree that the record evidence does not demonstrate a change in China’s 
treatment of Jehovah’s Witnesses.5  The 2008 International Religious Freedom Report 
states that many Christian groups no longer operate in secrecy and that the government’s 
repression is inconsistent and sporadic.  (A.R. at 236-37.)  Further, although the 
government seeks to repress groups it has designated as “cults,” which includes several 
Christian groups and Falun Gong, the Jehovah’s Witness church is not among those 
listed.  (Id.
 The Board also properly afforded little weight to a letter Li submitted from a 
practicing Jehovah’s Witness living in the United States who claims that Li will go to jail 
in China for studying the Bible with Jehovah’s Witnesses.  (
 at 238.)  Li claims that Jehovah’s Witnesses are treated similarly to 
practitioners of Falun Gong, but there is no record evidence supporting her contention.   
Id.
                                              
5  We need not address whether Li’s decision to embrace this religion demonstrates a 
change in her personal circumstances, rather than country conditions, because even if Li 
was a Jehovah’s Witness at her initial hearing, she did not present material evidence of 
changed country conditions so as to warrant relief under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). 
 at 143-46.)  There is no 
evidence to demonstrate that the author has any relevant knowledge regarding country 
conditions in China.  In sum, Li did not provide any evidence which would undermine 
the BIA’s conclusion that there has not been a significant change in the treatment of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses since the date of her last hearing.   
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 Because Li did not present material evidence of changed country conditions, the 
BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion to reopen. 
 Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review. 
 
 
 
 
  
